Our discussion last Friday on La Tondue was very interesting because it seemed to have very similar aspects to a backlash on French women that occurred in the last decade of the eighteenth century, and the backlash that occured directly following World War I (which we have discussed in class). In all of these, the general trend tends to be a reassertion of control over the female gender to keep women in the more traditional role within the private sphere (as opposed to the political sphere).
In the backlash of the eighteenth century, the role of women in French society had reached a very high point. Over the century upper class women hosted salons, and though they were not encouraged to speak or debate, they played the important role of inviting the intellectuals of the time, cultivating social connections between them, and guiding discussions if they appeared to not be going in the direction intended (which is arguably a huge role because the saloness could influence the outcome of discussion). Similarly, women of the lower classes began exercising political power during the Revolution by storming hte Bastille, organizing and participating in bread strikes, storming the palace and arresting the royal family, and forming influential political organizations (Society for Revolutionary Women). The role of women was incredibly modern, but after the assassination of Marat by Charlotte Corday and the execution of many women leaders during the Jacobin Terror, it seemed apparent that it would not last.
La Tondue can be viewed in very much the same way. These women were accused of involving themselves in the politcal sphere by aiding Nazis in the regime established in France, and were punished for it. In so doing, they broke their traditionally established role that remains outside the politics. But, by doing continuing similar activity with the Allied soldiers and incurring the same wrath, one gets the sense that France was at a failure to come to terms with not spearheading modernity. By the mid nineteenth century, France was no longer the intellectual capital of Europe, and they had now been defeated twice by Germany in a quarter of a century. It seems ironic that the French would resort back to traditional ideals instead of attempting to foster a more modern view.
Monday, April 12, 2010
Friday, April 2, 2010
Passing and Hiding in the Christian World
When comparing and contrasting the hardships that Jewish people faced in the concentration camps with those that "hid" in Germany or conquered territories, it is impossible to deny that there existed some similarities, but it seems that, overall, Jewish people who were forced into extermination camps were subjected to an infinitely more horrific experience.
The argument can be made that both experiences were physically and psychologically similar; Jewish people who were forced into hiding experienced food shortages and trouble finding sustenance, while the rations given in camps were severely inadequate. Psychologically, both individuals did have to deal with the sense that their nation (and later practically all of Europe, after the Third Reich succeeded in capturing most of the European mainland) had turned against them on something as arbitrary as religion or ethnicity. However, theses comparisons can only be made in the broad sense.
Physically, those who went into hiding were not beaten and battered to the extent that those who experienced the atrocities of the cams were. In many cases, individuals in hiding were relied on strenuous labor for food and shelter, but it is hard to imagine these individuals working ten to twelve hour days on food rations that would only enable them to survive for three to six months. Psychologically, those who went into hiding did not witness their friends and families being seperated into lines designated for mass executions or have to ponder that their survival came at the expense of another's life. Those in hiding may have witnessed the initial rounding-up of Jewish people for "relocation," the experience is more affecting when death is seen as inevitable (though it can be said that fear of being rounded up could lead to severe paranoia). Individuals in camps had everything seized from them, while those who were in hiding still maintained some sense of freedom (many people in hiding were able to move to different towns or territories in search of betterment provided they had documentation).
Given this analysis it seems impossible to compare the two experience in anything but broad terms. It is true that existence under both circumstances would be horrible, but those who were in hiding had a better standard of living and a higher survival rate.
The argument can be made that both experiences were physically and psychologically similar; Jewish people who were forced into hiding experienced food shortages and trouble finding sustenance, while the rations given in camps were severely inadequate. Psychologically, both individuals did have to deal with the sense that their nation (and later practically all of Europe, after the Third Reich succeeded in capturing most of the European mainland) had turned against them on something as arbitrary as religion or ethnicity. However, theses comparisons can only be made in the broad sense.
Physically, those who went into hiding were not beaten and battered to the extent that those who experienced the atrocities of the cams were. In many cases, individuals in hiding were relied on strenuous labor for food and shelter, but it is hard to imagine these individuals working ten to twelve hour days on food rations that would only enable them to survive for three to six months. Psychologically, those who went into hiding did not witness their friends and families being seperated into lines designated for mass executions or have to ponder that their survival came at the expense of another's life. Those in hiding may have witnessed the initial rounding-up of Jewish people for "relocation," the experience is more affecting when death is seen as inevitable (though it can be said that fear of being rounded up could lead to severe paranoia). Individuals in camps had everything seized from them, while those who were in hiding still maintained some sense of freedom (many people in hiding were able to move to different towns or territories in search of betterment provided they had documentation).
Given this analysis it seems impossible to compare the two experience in anything but broad terms. It is true that existence under both circumstances would be horrible, but those who were in hiding had a better standard of living and a higher survival rate.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
The Rise of the Nazis
In class we have discussed how Fascism can flourish when democracy fails. Mussolini and Hitler both rose to power in political vacuums, and were able to capitalize on disintegrating order, but how much of it was the fault of the people who supported their rise?
Before the collapse of the Weimar, Germany wasn't doing so bad. There still existed some strains and tensions due to the end of the Great War (repartations, loss of territory, and the war guilt clause), but in the period from 1918 to 1933 the Republic was able to draft a constitution, suppress right and left wing militancy (specifically by 1923), improve the economy, and be admitted into the League of Nations. Though the world depression hit in 1929, why were Germans so unhappy with the Weimar Republic, and what made Nazisim so appealing?
Hyperinflation and the death of Streseman could be seen as pitfalls for the Republic. And a coalition needed to be formed to ensure the continuance of a smooth government, but why, despite heading the largest party in the Reichstag, would von Hindenburg form a coalition with a political dissenter? There is the lesser of two evils theory: Hitler's conservativism was better than radical leftists who were vocally dissenting. But, this still appears to be a poor choice for leaders in the Weimar because he had already proven that he was against the governement in 1923 with the Beer Hall Putsch.
German citizens could also be blamed for Hitler's rise. They backed a man who since the early twenties had played off hatred for minority groups (hatred that had arguably been instilled in Germany since the massacres of Jews during the marches to the Crusades). But, even after he assumed the chancelorship, his policies directly reflected meglomania and militancy. His school policies were blantant attempts to indoctrinate children into racially motivated militancy, the creation of Hitler youth and the Nazi control of early motherhood showed their desires to cradle children into Fascist society from a young age while limiting the power and influence of the family, and the gradual decrease in privacy coupled with the increase of paranoia would yield the conclusion that the government was on a wrong path. This having been said, is it the entire German people's fault for the atrocities of World War II, or were the Nazis just that good at indoctrinating and propagating?
Before the collapse of the Weimar, Germany wasn't doing so bad. There still existed some strains and tensions due to the end of the Great War (repartations, loss of territory, and the war guilt clause), but in the period from 1918 to 1933 the Republic was able to draft a constitution, suppress right and left wing militancy (specifically by 1923), improve the economy, and be admitted into the League of Nations. Though the world depression hit in 1929, why were Germans so unhappy with the Weimar Republic, and what made Nazisim so appealing?
Hyperinflation and the death of Streseman could be seen as pitfalls for the Republic. And a coalition needed to be formed to ensure the continuance of a smooth government, but why, despite heading the largest party in the Reichstag, would von Hindenburg form a coalition with a political dissenter? There is the lesser of two evils theory: Hitler's conservativism was better than radical leftists who were vocally dissenting. But, this still appears to be a poor choice for leaders in the Weimar because he had already proven that he was against the governement in 1923 with the Beer Hall Putsch.
German citizens could also be blamed for Hitler's rise. They backed a man who since the early twenties had played off hatred for minority groups (hatred that had arguably been instilled in Germany since the massacres of Jews during the marches to the Crusades). But, even after he assumed the chancelorship, his policies directly reflected meglomania and militancy. His school policies were blantant attempts to indoctrinate children into racially motivated militancy, the creation of Hitler youth and the Nazi control of early motherhood showed their desires to cradle children into Fascist society from a young age while limiting the power and influence of the family, and the gradual decrease in privacy coupled with the increase of paranoia would yield the conclusion that the government was on a wrong path. This having been said, is it the entire German people's fault for the atrocities of World War II, or were the Nazis just that good at indoctrinating and propagating?
Friday, February 26, 2010
Stakhanovism
I know that everyone is probably sick of discussing Soviet Russia, but I think the concept ot Stakhanovism is very interesting. In the 1920s, the Bolshevik party had already began to design a cult of the worker. Soviet propaganda posters and novels (also aimed at indoctrination through the promotion of literacy) such as Cement by Fyodor Gladkov ennobled the common worker. An entire movement of art was designed and promoted by the intelligentsia to help progress the notion of the soviet worker (soviet realism). But, what motives inspired Stalin to endorse the Stkahanovite movement, and was it beneficial to the Soviet economy and communist doctrine in general?
Several motives spurred the Stakhanovite movement. There were growing labor and production shortages within the Soviet Union. Stalin desired to industrialize at a more rapid rate to gain equal standing with other world powers, and arguably more importantly, he saw increased militarization of both western (Germany) and eastern (Japan) powers (both of which had engaged Russian in conflict within the past thirty years). Increased productivity of all industries would be needed during a war effort. Stalin could have also seen the Stakhanovite movement as a strengthening of the cult of the common worker initiated by Lenin in the 1920s.
In practice, Stakhanovism was, for the most part, ineffective. Local industries were unable to supply adequate materials for factories despite mandates from above, bottle-necking invovled with distribution occurred, and quotas set to high were often unattainable. But, was Stakhanovism concurrent with Leninist doctrine (by this time Stalin had already created the cult of Lenin in Soviet society)? On the positive side, workers were now able to openly criticize supervisors, and Stakhanovites often advocated the betterment of all workers with their statements and opinions, but increases in wages brought about tensions within the strata of workers. It can be argued that the glorification of the Stakhanovites set up a class within an allegedly classless society. Thurston would disagree with this claim (with merit), but even if it did not create a class of elite workers, it did ignite distinctions between existing classes of workers.
In all industries, there were tiers of workers. The common, uneducated workers were now at a position to make demands and criticize their superiors (foremen, managers, engineers, etc.) By increasing the pay and influence of some elite workers (sometimes to the point where their bonuses exceeded the salaries of superiors) the Stakhanovite movement alientated tiers within the working class. It can be argued that Lenin would have allowed this (the NEP provided incentives for farmers in the rural areas), but if he did allow this, it would have been with great reluctance (as it was with the NEP incentives). I believe that the Stakhanovite movement veered greatly (though greatly disguised) from communist doctrine. While reflecting this, could the movement have been a ploy to initiate and continue Stalin's purges?
Several motives spurred the Stakhanovite movement. There were growing labor and production shortages within the Soviet Union. Stalin desired to industrialize at a more rapid rate to gain equal standing with other world powers, and arguably more importantly, he saw increased militarization of both western (Germany) and eastern (Japan) powers (both of which had engaged Russian in conflict within the past thirty years). Increased productivity of all industries would be needed during a war effort. Stalin could have also seen the Stakhanovite movement as a strengthening of the cult of the common worker initiated by Lenin in the 1920s.
In practice, Stakhanovism was, for the most part, ineffective. Local industries were unable to supply adequate materials for factories despite mandates from above, bottle-necking invovled with distribution occurred, and quotas set to high were often unattainable. But, was Stakhanovism concurrent with Leninist doctrine (by this time Stalin had already created the cult of Lenin in Soviet society)? On the positive side, workers were now able to openly criticize supervisors, and Stakhanovites often advocated the betterment of all workers with their statements and opinions, but increases in wages brought about tensions within the strata of workers. It can be argued that the glorification of the Stakhanovites set up a class within an allegedly classless society. Thurston would disagree with this claim (with merit), but even if it did not create a class of elite workers, it did ignite distinctions between existing classes of workers.
In all industries, there were tiers of workers. The common, uneducated workers were now at a position to make demands and criticize their superiors (foremen, managers, engineers, etc.) By increasing the pay and influence of some elite workers (sometimes to the point where their bonuses exceeded the salaries of superiors) the Stakhanovite movement alientated tiers within the working class. It can be argued that Lenin would have allowed this (the NEP provided incentives for farmers in the rural areas), but if he did allow this, it would have been with great reluctance (as it was with the NEP incentives). I believe that the Stakhanovite movement veered greatly (though greatly disguised) from communist doctrine. While reflecting this, could the movement have been a ploy to initiate and continue Stalin's purges?
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Rites of War
I thought the Modris Eckstein excerpt was especially interesting because it addresses the new atrocities of modern warfare that were introduced during the first stage of the war. Eckstein then further proposes that these "advancements" (for lack of a better term) were the product of the "revolutionary" ideology prevalent in Germany prior to and during the war.
According to Eckstein, Germany was the first to make effective use of trench warfare, gaseous warfare, the flamethrower, its infamous U-boat warfare, and the concept of Schreklichkeit (though it could be argued that the British were just as inhumane towards civilians during the Boer War), and, in so doing, drastically elevated modern warfare into what many critics claimed to be an inhumane level. By 1916, British and French troops were also utilizing gases and flamethrowers (though the latter was not used to the extent) and had successfully adopted strategies of defense (which appeared to be, for obvious reasons, more successful then attempting to storm across "no man's land" to break enemy lines).
However, it is important to note that these strategies that revolutionized the way future conflicts would be fought also appeared to have had negative effects on the German war effort. On the international level, many denounced the use of the unnecessarily viscious flamethrowers, and opposed the notion that gases were more humane than traditional weapons, but, more importantly, the "Rape of Belgium" was a rallying cry for the British, as was the Lusitania for the United States. It could be argued that Germany's "total war" tactics were most effective in losing Germany the war.
The vivid decriptions in this excerpt also jolted my memory to the many artists who were influenced by the atrocities of trench warfare. T.S. Eliot, Ernest Hemingway, Pablo Picasso, Henry James, and others are going to be greatly affected by the experiences and descriptions of World War I. T.S. Eliot's "The Hollow Men" is going to directly pertain to the Great War, but all of these individuals are going to deal with a question that begins to develop prior to the war, but rises to its zenith after conflict has ended and the barbarities have been observed: where is man's place in the modern world? This "modern dillemma" is going to greatly influence the arts, and go so far as to force many citizens (the Lost Generation) to become willing expatriates. Though World War I inspired many of these thinkers and artists in future endeavors, I would like to hear opinions on to what extent the war influenced the modern movement in the arts.
According to Eckstein, Germany was the first to make effective use of trench warfare, gaseous warfare, the flamethrower, its infamous U-boat warfare, and the concept of Schreklichkeit (though it could be argued that the British were just as inhumane towards civilians during the Boer War), and, in so doing, drastically elevated modern warfare into what many critics claimed to be an inhumane level. By 1916, British and French troops were also utilizing gases and flamethrowers (though the latter was not used to the extent) and had successfully adopted strategies of defense (which appeared to be, for obvious reasons, more successful then attempting to storm across "no man's land" to break enemy lines).
However, it is important to note that these strategies that revolutionized the way future conflicts would be fought also appeared to have had negative effects on the German war effort. On the international level, many denounced the use of the unnecessarily viscious flamethrowers, and opposed the notion that gases were more humane than traditional weapons, but, more importantly, the "Rape of Belgium" was a rallying cry for the British, as was the Lusitania for the United States. It could be argued that Germany's "total war" tactics were most effective in losing Germany the war.
The vivid decriptions in this excerpt also jolted my memory to the many artists who were influenced by the atrocities of trench warfare. T.S. Eliot, Ernest Hemingway, Pablo Picasso, Henry James, and others are going to be greatly affected by the experiences and descriptions of World War I. T.S. Eliot's "The Hollow Men" is going to directly pertain to the Great War, but all of these individuals are going to deal with a question that begins to develop prior to the war, but rises to its zenith after conflict has ended and the barbarities have been observed: where is man's place in the modern world? This "modern dillemma" is going to greatly influence the arts, and go so far as to force many citizens (the Lost Generation) to become willing expatriates. Though World War I inspired many of these thinkers and artists in future endeavors, I would like to hear opinions on to what extent the war influenced the modern movement in the arts.
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